Priority Queuing Reallocation: A Comparative Experimental Study of Mechanisms and Outcomes
Keywords:
Priority Queuing, Reallocation Mechanisms, Queue EfficiencyAbstract
This study, Priority Queuing Reallocation: A Comparative Experimental Study of Mechanisms and Outcomes, investigates the impact of various reallocation mechanisms on the efficiency and fairness of priority queuing systems. Priority queuing is a fundamental method for managing service sequences across diverse sectors, including healthcare, transportation, and customer service. While traditional priority queuing assigns service based on predefined priority levels, reallocation mechanisms allow for dynamic adjustments, enabling entities to "trade places" within the queue to optimize outcomes. This research employs controlled laboratory experiments to compare two distinct reallocation strategies: the server-initiated auction, where the server sells the right to be served next to the highest bidding customer, and the customer-initiated auction, where new arrivals can sequentially trade places with queued customers. The study evaluates these mechanisms based on criteria such as queue efficiency, service fairness, and participant satisfaction. Findings indicate that both reallocation mechanisms enhance queue efficiency compared to traditional methods. However, the server-initiated auction is perceived as fairer by participants, despite both mechanisms achieving similar efficiency gains. These insights offer valuable guidance for designing priority queuing systems that balance efficiency with fairness considerations.
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