SYSTEMIC RISK AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IN SECURITIES MARKETS: STRESS TESTING, LIQUIDITY, AND CONTAGION ANALYSIS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55640/Keywords:
Systemic Risk, Financial Contagion, Liquidity Spirals, Stress Testing, Non-Bank Financial Intermediation (NBFI), SRISK, CoVaR, Overlapping Portfolios, Fire Sales, Macroprudential Policy, Central Counterparties (CCPs).Abstract
The architecture of the global financial system has undergone a fundamental transformation in the twenty-first century, characterized by the migration of credit intermediation from traditional banking balance sheets to complex, market-based networks comprising Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries (NBFIs), Central Counterparties (CCPs), and high-frequency trading venues. This research report provides an exhaustive analysis of systemic risk within this evolving landscape, with a specific focus on securities markets. We synthesize advanced theoretical frameworks—ranging from network topology and multiplex contagion models to the thermodynamics of liquidity spirals—with empirical evidence from recent stress episodes, including the 2020 "Dash for Cash" and the 2022 UK LDI crisis. The study critically evaluates the efficacy of modern quantitative systemic risk measures, such as CoVaR, SRISK, and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), demonstrating their divergent predictive capabilities regarding capital shortfalls and distress propagation. Furthermore, we dissect the mechanics of stress testing, advocating for a paradigm shift from static solvency checks to dynamic, system-wide simulations that incorporate endogenous behavioral responses, fire sale externalities, and liquidity-solvency feedback loops. By examining the regulatory frontiers established by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and IOSCO through 2025, this report identifies persistent vulnerabilities in the NBFI sector—specifically liquidity mismatches and hidden synthetic leverage—and proposes a multi-layered macroprudential surveillance framework designed to mitigate the transmission of shocks across the global financial periphery.
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