STRENGTHENING CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CORRUPTION OFFENSES: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES (THE CASE OF UZBEKISTAN)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55640/Keywords:
corruption crimes, criminal liability, Uzbekistan, anti-corruption law, proportionality, rule of law.Abstract
Corruption-related crimes pose a serious threat to the rule of law, democratic governance, and sustainable economic development. In transitional legal systems such as Uzbekistan, recent reforms have aimed to strengthen criminal liability for corruption offenses by increasing penalties and establishing specialized anti-corruption institutions. Despite these measures, corruption remains a persistent systemic problem. This article analyzes the effectiveness of strengthened criminal liability for corruption offenses from substantive, procedural, and institutional perspectives. Using doctrinal legal analysis, comparative methodology, and a normative approach grounded in proportionality and human rights principles, the study demonstrates that punitive escalation alone is insufficient to deter corruption. The article argues that sustainable anti-corruption policy requires legal clarity, inevitability of punishment, institutional independence, and respect for fundamental rights.
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