PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (PPPS): ESSENCE, FORMS, AND INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55640/Keywords:
Public-Private Partnerships, Infrastructure Finance, Institutional Mechanisms, Risk Allocation, Contingent Liabilities, Sovereign Fiscal Frameworks, Asset Lifecycle Management.Abstract
This article explores the theoretical foundation, structurally diverse modalities, and institutional governance architectures underpinning Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). Operating as a critical modern socioeconomic instrument, PPPs facilitate strategic long-term collaboration between public authorities and private market entities to mobilize capital, balance systemic risk, and enhance public infrastructure delivery. The research comprehensively evaluates the operational forms of PPP frameworks—ranging from Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) to Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO)—and evaluates the vital legislative, regulatory, and financial oversight structures required to prevent fiscal imbalances. Leveraging contemporary performance indicator data from transitioning economies, specifically focusing on the infrastructure portfolio expansion within the Republic of Uzbekistan, the study isolates critical institutional friction points. Ultimately, it delivers strategic recommendations designed to minimize state contingent liabilities while optimizing the social returns on public utility asset investments.
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References
1. Dwight, L. (2025). Republic of Uzbekistan and Public-Private Partnerships: Country Lessons. IMF Selected Issues Paper (SIP/2025/087), International Monetary Fund. Washington, DC.
2. World Bank. (2024). Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships: Assessing Government Capability. World Bank Group Report. Washington, DC.
3.Shermatov, A. (2026). Improving Investment Attraction Mechanisms in Uzbekistan's Service Sector: Barriers, Opportunities, and Policy Recommendations. Innovation Science and Technology, 2(5), 870-883.
4. Grimsey, D., & Lewis, M. K. (2004). Public Private Partnerships: The Worldwide Revolution in Infrastructure Provision and Project Finance. Edward Elgar Publishing.
5. Flyvbjerg, B. (2009). Survival of the Unfittest: Why the Worst Infrastructure Gets Built—and How to Choose the Right Ones. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 25(3), 344-367.
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