

**THE INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM ON THE FORMATION OF  
AGRICULTURAL PERSONNEL AND IDEOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN ITS  
IMPLEMENTATION**

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**Abstract**

The material condition of agricultural personnel in Uzbekistan during the Soviet period from 1925 to 1941, the training of agricultural specialists, the formation of agricultural workers, the training of qualified personnel in the mass profession, and the problems and lessons learned in providing agricultural enterprises with highly qualified specialists are covered based on archival documents and sources.

**Key words**

agricultural personnel, Soviet system, party, center, administrative-command, collectivization, cotton cultivation, social life, local population, specialist, communist ideology, communist morality, chauvinism, authoritarian regime, localization.

**ҚИШЛОҚ ХЎЖАЛИГИ КАДРЛАРИНИ ШАКЛЛАНТИРИШДА СОВЕТ  
ТУЗИМИНИНГ ТАЪСИРИ ВА УНИ АМАЛГА ОШИРИШДА МАФКУРАВИЙ  
ЖАРАЁНЛАР**

**Аннотация**

Ўзбекистонда совет даврининг 1925-1941 йиллардаги қишлоқ хўжалик кадрларини шакллантириш, уларнинг моддий аҳволи, қишлоқ хўжалигига оид мутахассис кадрлар тайёрланиши, оммавий касбдаги малакали кадрларни тайёрлаш, аграр корхоналарни малакали мутахассислар билан таъминлаш муаммолари ва сабоқлари архив ҳужжатлари ва манбалар асосида ёритилган.

**Калит сўзлар**

қишлоқ хўжалик кадрлар, совет тузуми, партия, марказ, маъмурий-буйруқбозлик, жамоалаштириш, пахталаштириш, ижтимоий ҳаёт, маҳаллий аҳоли, мутахассис, коммунистик мафкура, коммунистик ахлоқ, шовинизм, авторитар режим, маҳаллийлаштириш

**ВЛИЯНИЕ СОВЕТСКОГО СТРОЯ НА ФОРМИРОВАНИЕ  
СЕЛЬСКОХОЗЯЙСТВЕННЫХ КАДРОВ И ИДЕОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ПРОЦЕССЫ  
ЕГО РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ**

**Аннотация**



На основе архивных документов и источников освещены материальное положение сельскохозяйственных кадров Узбекистана в советский период с 1920 по 1941 год, подготовка специалистов сельского хозяйства, формирование кадров сельскохозяйственных рабочих, подготовка квалифицированных кадров по массовым профессиям, проблемы и опыт обеспечения сельскохозяйственных предприятий высококвалифицированными специалистами.

### Ключевые слова

сельскохозяйственные кадры, советская система, партия, центр, административно-командный, коллективизация, хлопководство, общественная жизнь, местное население, специалист, коммунистическая идеология, коммунистическая мораль, шовинизм, авторитарный режим, локализация.

**Introduction.** The development of the agricultural sector and its management system in the Uzbek SSR was considered one of the priority directions of Soviet economic policy. In this process, the formation, training, and placement of agricultural personnel were carried out based on a centralized management mechanism, and they were mainly subordinated to the economic and political interests of the Union. For this reason, the policy of training personnel for the agrarian sector in the republic was aimed more at fulfilling the strategic tasks of the center than at meeting local needs. This chapter provides a scholarly analysis of the specific features of the formation of agricultural personnel, their social composition, areas of activity, and their interconnection with the policies of the central government.

The process of forming agricultural personnel played an important role in the implementation of the Soviet state's agrarian policy. The introduction of the kolkhoz-sovkhoz (collective and state farm) system in the republic, along with land and water reforms and collectivization processes, created the need to train and reorganize new managerial personnel in the agricultural sector. In this process, the selection, education, and integration of local personnel into the management system were carried out based on ideological and political criteria established by the center. This section analyzes the Soviet regime's influence on agricultural personnel, its practical mechanisms, and the socio-economic consequences of this policy, based on sources and archival materials.

In his book, which can be titled "What is the Friendship of Peoples," V.I. Lenin proposed the idea that "the revolutionary alliance of workers and peasants is the primary means of overthrowing Tsarism, the landowners, and the bourgeoisie," and put forth the creation of the "Socialist Workers' Party." He established that the working class would play the role of the revolutionary force in society, with the peasantry as its ally. This idea, advanced by V.I. Lenin, subsequently laid the groundwork for the organizational and political formation of the Socialist Workers' Party, ensuring its development as a mass movement. This theory, which absolutized the leading role of the working class and stipulated the peasantry's subordination to it, served as the ideological foundation for the formation of Soviet statehood. At the same time, this principle, in practice, served to cast relations between social groups into an ideological mold, leading to the restriction of the rural population's independent social interests. As a result, the idea of a worker-peasant alliance became an important tool for strengthening centralized governance and controlling the masses within the Soviet political system.

Although official programs of Soviet economic policy put forward the task of developing agriculture alongside industry, in practice, the agrarian sector was primarily viewed as a source

of resources for industrial development. The Bolshevik principle of "agriculture serving the interests of industry" manifested as a policy aimed at financing industrialization by forcibly mobilizing the material resources of the rural population and redirecting internal economic reserves to meet industrial needs[2].

Based on the theory of "the intensification of the class struggle under socialism" put forward by I.V. Stalin, special attention was given to the policy of creating division between social strata. Initiative groups, formed from activists among local farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants, were turned into the most effective form of propaganda. Brigades for recruiting peasants into collective farms were used as a distinctive propaganda tool. "Kolkhoznik Days" were held under slogans such as "For the Union of Farm Laborers, Middle Peasants, and Workers," "For the Proper Organization of Labor in Collective Farms," and "Let State Obligations in Collective Farms Be Fulfilled." [3] From its inception, the Soviet government focused on developing cotton cultivation in Uzbekistan's agriculture and began implementing a series of measures to strengthen individual cotton-growing farms. [4] These included benefits such as reducing the tax burden on poor peasants, providing preferential loans, supplying agricultural machinery and tools, and increasing agronomist assistance. To create conditions for peasants to engage in cotton cultivation, attention was paid to supplying them with wheat. [5] The policy of drawing peasants into collectivization through propaganda groups and mobilization brigades was used as an effective means of controlling the masses. At the same time, the priority given to cotton cultivation led to the one-sided development of agriculture, weakening the stability of the agrarian sector. As a result, this policy laid the groundwork for the strengthening of administrative-ideological control in agriculture and the intensification of social conflicts.

During the periods under study, a high demand for qualified specialists in the agricultural sector was evident in the republic. The majority of them were concentrated in the middle and upper echelons, mainly in the People's Commissariat for Land Affairs and district agricultural departments. Moreover, during these years, the managerial staff in the agricultural sector was predominantly composed of non-indigenous nationalities. Specifically, out of 153 specialists holding leadership positions in agricultural organizations, only 31 were representatives of the local population [6]. Many of these managers, lacking sufficient knowledge of the region's specific conditions, failed to perform their assigned duties satisfactorily. This, naturally, hindered the task of elevating agrarian reforms to an adequate level.

In 1925, 85% of the region's population was employed in agriculture. The share of agricultural output amounted to approximately 80% of the total gross product. 90% of the industry was engaged in the primary processing of agricultural raw materials [7]. In 1925, land used for farming constituted only 58.7% of the republic's existing arable land [8]. In January-March 1926, work commenced in Uzbekistan to unify local agricultural cooperatives and organize cotton production within them [9]. It became evident that with the rise of the collective farm movement, Uzbekistan's agriculture faced the challenge of being supplied with new types of personnel, including collective farm chairpersons, agronomists, irrigators, brigade leaders, tractor drivers, field managers, and zootechnicians. These challenges demanded a proper solution to the personnel issue within the agricultural sector. It was necessary to prevent any disorganization in the training of personnel in this field. According to official data, the number of collective farms in Uzbekistan reached 110 in 1925. By 1927, their number had grown to 864 [10].

Based on his experience and knowledge, F. Khodjaev reacted to the implementation of the "Stalinist" policy in rural areas. He sought to strengthen the economic base of the collective

farms, paying special attention to the advantages of reducing cotton fields and implementing crop rotation. He particularly subjected the violence and command-style administration being implemented in agriculture to harsh criticism[11]. As a result of the establishment of Stalinist rule in the country, the age-old economy reached a point where it was completely beyond recovery, and the situation regarding grain cultivation grew extremely dire. This was because the allocation of irrigated lands to cotton fields progressively devastated this sector. Analyzing the issue, F. Khodjaev noted that from 1928 to 1933, despite an increase in irrigated lands from 349.1 thousand hectares to 1,118.5 thousand hectares, the yield decreased by 1 million poods[12]. Regarding cotton production, F. Khodjaev officially stated, "Despite the factory being located in the center of the cotton-growing district, for some reason, it is to be supplied with third-grade cotton. Furthermore, this cotton must be brought in from other districts. And yet, good cotton can be sourced from Fergana itself. Not a single person from the leadership has raised this issue of disorder and criminality before either the Party or Soviet organizations"[13]. The growth of agriculture was hindered by the errors of collectivization. Free trade, private property, and entrepreneurship were put to an end. The reduction in the purchase price of agricultural products led to a food problem, and the peasants became much more impoverished.

Local leaders also had their own views on the policies being implemented. Y. Oxunboboyev, one of the local leaders, expressed his opinion in a manner consistent with the politics of the era: "On July 12, 1926, I departed for the Fergana region to inspect and familiarize myself with the progress of the land reform work. The Soviet government's decision regarding the transfer of land was formulated taking into account the interests of the people. Overall, the work is progressing very well. Not only that, but the localization commissions are on the ground, carrying out the tasks entrusted to them. The farm worker has the right to a decent human life and possesses the same rights as any peasant who owns land; he is a working man[14]. In August 1926, there were 8,130 visitors in total, consisting of 5,452 peasants, 1,768 workers and employees, 385 disabled individuals, 212 self-employed persons, and 313 private traders. The workers were concerned about work, housing, benefits, violations of labor laws, and various other questions. The disabled were interested in pensions, housing, and other questions. The peasants came mainly regarding land and water, tax, economic, and other matters[15]. Among the visitors, there were 1,626 appeals concerning land and water, 191 on taxes, 1,280 on criminal cases, 199 on economic issues, 1,072 on labor, 1,112 on benefits, pensions, and scholarships, 126 on housing, 273 on violations of labor laws, and 1,935 on various other issues[16]."

Between 1925 and 1930, the government established a new inter-republican division of labor. Consequently, Uzbekistan was tasked with being the main cotton base within this framework, and by the 1930s, the republic was supplying 60% of all cotton grown throughout the Union. In addition to cotton, the republic's industrious agricultural workers were also considered the primary base for the USSR in the cultivation of several other important agricultural products. Uzbekistan held its place in the national economic system by supplying a significant portion of the Union's cotton fiber (89.7%), hemp, silk (42%), vegetable oil (56.4%), Karakul pelts, fruits, grapes, vegetables, and melons[17]. From the very beginning, the Union government assigned the leadership of the young Uzbek republic the strategic task of transforming "Soviet Uzbekistan" into the main cotton base of the USSR. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), clearly expressing imperial interests, adopted several extensive resolutions after 1925, which emphasized the importance of cotton cultivation in creating a raw material base for the textile industry and ending the Union's foreign dependency in the cotton sector[18]. As a result, the gross harvest of raw cotton in 1928 reached 543.7 thousand tons. In total, between 1925 and 1929, the republic's farmers harvested and

delivered 1,961.1 thousand tons of cotton. This amounted to an average of 392.2 thousand tons per year[19].

As a result of the 1925-1929 land and water reforms in Uzbekistan, 1,492 "pomeshchik-type" (landowner) farms were liquidated. The land of 27,992 farms was confiscated or reduced[20]. Beginning in 1928, a policy of rapidly organizing collective farms (kolkhozes) was implemented. For example, in the Kashkadarya, Surkhandarya, and Khorezm districts, 1,125 of the 4,382 farms that had acquired land during the reform process were forcibly merged into agricultural artels; however, this was not the case during the land and water reforms in the Tashkent, Samarkand, and Fergana regions[21]. In 1928-1929, the total number of partnerships for all types of agriculture was 1,272, and cooperative peasant farms numbered 619,380, which constituted 76% of the total number of peasant farms[22]. I.V. Stalin's article "Year of the Great Break," published on November 7, 1929, theoretically justified collectivization. It asserted that the necessary socio-political conditions had been established for the rural population's transition to the collective farm system, and interpreted the policy of accelerating collectivization as a legitimate process[23]. This article also emphasized that the policy of strengthening centralized management in agriculture, increasing control over the activities of peasants, and restructuring the workforce based on ideological criteria would be consistently implemented. The state took complete control over rural laborers. Persecutions were organized against the wealthy strata of the rural population. The rural population was forcibly enrolled in collective farms.

A resolution by the November 1929 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) proposed sending at least 25,000 workers to "individual-farm" villages. They were tasked with ensuring the escalation of the "agrarian revolution" in the localities. Their core consisted of "initiative" workers dispatched from Moscow, Leningrad, and Ivanovo. From February 1930 to January 1931, 458 people received assignments to go to Uzbekistan. Among them were 149 from Moscow, 64 from Leningrad, and 200 workers from the Ivanovo Oblast. This group also included 62 female textile workers. Of these, 362 began working in the republic's villages[24]. Another 400 people were scheduled to arrive in 1931[25]. 437 worker cadres were sent to Uzbekistan from the central regions of Russia. Alongside them, local worker cadres recruited an additional 263 people[26]. The "Twenty-Five Thousanders" assisted party organizations in establishing collective farms. Initiative groups, formed from activists among local farm laborers (batraks), the poor, and middle-class peasants, were considered the most effective form of propaganda. Additionally, brigades composed of collective farm activists, tasked with recruiting peasants, were used as a distinctive propaganda tool. These brigades demonstrated zeal not only in their own districts but also in districts lagging behind the pace of collectivization, working to persuade peasants to join collective farms, identify kulak households, and find kulaks in hiding. In 1930, within the system of the Uzbek Cotton Union alone, 940 batrak and poor peasant groups were formed in 60 districts, comprising 20,491 members[27]. While poor activists were united against the "kulaks," the "Twenty-Five Thousanders" - who had no understanding of agriculture or local conditions whatsoever - led the newly established agricultural artels. The majority of them were sham "initiators" with little life knowledge or experience, inspired by the high-flown slogans of the era. Until recently, the activities of the Twenty-Five Thousanders were praised to the skies. The notion that they had made a huge contribution to Uzbekistan's development was repeatedly affirmed in various speeches and books by the "Big Brothers," as well as by Uzbekistan's sycophantic Soviet scholars and state leaders. It has now become clear that much of this was a lie, as the consequences of Stalinist collectivization have come to light. A new social stratum was formed in Soviet society: the "class of collective-farm peasants." In a short time, a new collective farm

elite began to form in the persons of collective farm chairmen, party secretaries, brigade leaders, section chiefs, and accountants, and the social and material standing of these elite representatives differed significantly from that of ordinary collective farmers.

In April 1930, 63% of peasant farms in Uzbekistan, totaling 507,500 households, were brought into collective farms (kolkhozes). Their social composition was 20% farm laborers (batraks), 58% poor peasants, and 22% middle-income peasants. These results were achieved through administrative pressure and intimidation of the peasantry. The leadership intensified severe psychological and emotional pressure on the peasants, telling them: "Don't say a word; if you don't join the kolkhoz, you won't get bread or industrial goods, you'll be deprived of your voting rights and evicted from the district." Slatenkov, the Deputy Chairman of the Yangiyul District Executive Committee, repeatedly declared in meetings: "For those who do not join the kolkhoz, there is no place even on Mars." When an ordinary farm laborer or poor peasant spoke out against the kolkhoz at a meeting, it was grounds to label them a "tail of the kulak" and place them in the "first category" of punishment. This often had tragic consequences, leading to a sentence of 10 years in prison or execution. The principles of voluntariness and freedom in the collectivization process were grossly violated, leading to rampant lawlessness and violence. A policy was implemented against the business-minded, entrepreneurial, and politically active segment of the rural population who opposed collectivization and did not want to part with their land and property. Alongside restrictions in tax and credit policies and the denial of water, this policy included stripping them of their voting rights, confiscating their property, and forcibly deporting their entire families to distant regions. The passport system introduced in the country in 1932 significantly worsened the situation for collective farmers, as they were not issued passports under the new system. This prevented them from entering cities and restricted their freedom of movement. The rationale was that collective farm peasants should remain fully engaged in agricultural work, not leave their villages, and not escape the arduous labor. The outcomes of the agrarian and social policies of the Party and the Soviet state were disastrous, inflicting unprecedented tragedies upon the Uzbek peasantry. They were transformed from property owners into simple, poor laborers subservient to collective and state farms. The traditional social structure of the Uzbek village and the traditional way of life of its people were completely Sovietized.

While criticizing the proliferation of artificial "paper collective farms," I.V. Stalin cited the example of Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan. In the March 2, 1930 issue of the "Pravda" newspaper, an article titled "Dizzy with Success" was published. The article openly acknowledged the violation of the "principle of voluntary collectivization" and the existence of "attempts to build the collective farm movement through bureaucratic decree." [33] In his article, I.V. Stalin did not say a word about revising the economically flawed principles of the collectivization policy being implemented by the VKP (b) Central Committee. On the contrary, stating that "some comrades became dizzy with success and lost their heads. For a short time, they lost their vigilance," he shifted all responsibility for "deviations" from the party's main line onto the local leading cadres who "failed to maintain contact with the peasant masses." [34] In general, however, the representatives served, to a certain extent, to establish administrative-command oppression in the villages and to keep the peasants in check using Stalinist methods. Of course, they had not considered that their activities would lead to such consequences.

The transition of peasants to large industrial enterprises became widespread in the early 1930s. The Party and Soviet bodies paid special attention to this. In 1931, the Sredazbyuro (Central Asian Bureau) adopted a resolution to transfer approximately 11,000 peasants to various sectors of the Central Asian national economy [35]. By April 1931, 63% of peasant farms in

Uzbekistan, or 507,500 households, had been incorporated into collective farms (kolkhozes). Their social composition was as follows: farm laborers (batraks) - 20%, the poor - 50%, and middle-income peasants - 22%[36]. The number of agronomists across the republic grew by 419 in 1933, and by that year, 455 agronomists and 624 agricultural technicians were working in the republic. Among agricultural technicians, the share of workers from local nationalities increased to 75%[37]. It was crucial to convince the communists who were economic managers that it was impossible to lead an enterprise without mastering technology and having a thorough understanding of production. For this reason, Stalin, in his speech on February 4, 1931, stated: "It is time to destroy the rotten view of non-interference in production. The time has come to master the new equipment appropriate for the modern era. If you are a factory director, involve yourself in every matter, strive to understand everything completely, let nothing escape your notice, learn and learn again. The time is ripe for the Bolsheviks themselves to become specialists. During the reconstruction period, technology decides everything" [38]. The data presented indicate that during the Stalinist period, priority was given to technical knowledge and production experience in the training of managerial personnel. The requirement for managers to be directly involved in the production process and to deeply master technology was aimed at increasing the practical effectiveness of the industrialization policy. Through this approach, the goal was to strengthen the professional capacity of Party cadres in addition to their ideological training. As a result, the policy of technically training managerial personnel became an important tool for strengthening control over production under the administrative-command system.

Illiteracy among agricultural workers was high between 1930 and 1933. Consequently, it was necessary to eliminate illiteracy among 72,000 agricultural workers. Among the pressing problems were the late start of the academic year, the failure to prepare appropriate buildings on time, and the low level of teachers' knowledge[39]. In 1931, 7,289 managerial personnel were trained for the collective and state farms of the Central Asian republics[40]. In that same year, the total number of specialists working in Uzbekistan's agriculture reached 11,945[41]. In Uzbekistan, from 1930 to 1935, more than 100,000 people were educated in various courses organized by the People's Commissariat of Agriculture[42]. In 1933, young employees aged 18 to 25 constituted 40% of the agricultural leadership, which included collective farm managers, brigade leaders, farm managers, agronomists, and zootechnicians[43]. According to data from the end of 1933, of those promoted to leadership positions in state farms alone, only 92 had higher education and 172 had secondary education[44]. The main tasks set by the government for the political departments were to continuously evaluate collective farm personnel and to promote the most progressive, active collective farmers, who were dedicated to the new construction, to responsible and decisive areas of production. In 1933, 15,531 managers and specialists were active at the MTS, 50% of whom had higher and secondary specialized education[45]. In 1933, the majority of workers in the republic's cities increased due to the influx of the rural population who came for construction work. The government of Uzbekistan defined the tasks of eliminating the technical illiteracy and semi-literacy of collective farm chairmen, brigade leaders, and other leading workers, and teaching them the basic principles of labor organization, accounting, and reporting. By the beginning of 1935, a total of 3,225 collective farm chairmen, 10,805 brigade leaders, 4,226 timekeepers, 803 harvest chairmen, and 8,178 machine operators underwent special training and improved their qualifications in various courses throughout the republic[46]. In 1935, women constituted 25% of the members of production cooperative artels, and among them were 34 collective farm chairwomen, 59 deputy chairwomen, 257 brigade leaders, 2,723 assistant brigade leaders, 103 timekeepers, and others[47]. In 1936-1937, there were 162,000 managerial personnel in Uzbekistan, of whom 7,000 were collective farm chairmen, 25,000 were brigade leaders, and 130,000 were team

leaders[48]. This figure for the work experience of collective farm chairmen was 34.7%[49]. These indicators were even lower in the republic's collective farms, and the number of machine operators also decreased during the war years. Traditionally, the construction season provided an opportunity for additional employment. Workers from rural areas began to participate in the construction of newly established factories and plants. Housewives and minors, who were also primarily from the families of workers and collective farmers, formed the basis of the working class. Minors were hired as apprentices after graduating from Factory Apprenticeship Schools (FZU). In addition to socio-economic factors, the slow pace of urbanization among the cultural and local population, the transition from a traditional rural to an urban lifestyle, and the somewhat lagging shift from seasonal agricultural life to permanent work in industrial enterprises also had a negative impact on the involvement of Uzbeks in industrial production.

Due to the administrative-command policy implemented in Uzbekistan, a cotton monopoly emerged in the country. This was spearheaded by Uzbek state and political figures such as F. Khodjaev, A. Ikramov, Y. Akhunbabaev, and U. Yusupov, who were executing the orders of the center. Based on their own experiences, they also spoke the truth. F. Khodjaev stated, "I am deeply affected by the fact that in the districts, the morale of the peasants is very low; they answer questions reluctantly... Here, the chairman of the collective farm is called 'the master,' and the foreman 'the junior master.' The chairman of the district executive committee is called 'the great master'... several poor people were imprisoned, portrayed as assistants to the basmachi for their active participation, and even some criminals in our own apparatus beat the peasants... [50], Administrative arbitrariness is the primary method of our organizations in the districts. We must create local cadres in these districts... and rectify incorrect practices such as assigning work to individual peasants without considering their capabilities," [51] he concluded. These thoughts of F. Khodjaev, stemming from his deep study of the local conditions of his time, are also of great importance for our independent country today. In his speech at the IV Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Uzbekistan, A. Ikramov frankly expressed his views, such as: "We are often masters of striking down, meaning that when it comes to cherishing, promoting, and training personnel, we are not always able to do this work... Here, in the party organizations of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Uzbekistan's apparatus, they have become quite carried away with this. The purpose of giving an account of one's work is not to hold any sort of trial over a person, but to educate and develop cadres and to help people. This must be understood," [52] expressing his thoughts truthfully.

In connection with the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) "On Additional Payments to Collective Farm Workers Who Increase the Yield of Agricultural Crops and Livestock Productivity in the Uzbek SSR," the number of individual competitors on collective farms grew, and all collective farmers began to exceed their daily work quotas. However, on collective farms where the Party and government's resolution on paying additional wages to farmers who increased their harvest was not thoroughly implemented, the inter-row cultivation of cotton and the fulfillment of socialist competition conditions were in an unsatisfactory state.[53]. In 1938, the collective farmers of the Pop district built a 9-kilometer canal using their own efforts and funds. Following the example of the collective farms of the Pop district, the collective farmers of the Fergana district built the Lagan Canal in 1939. During this construction, thousands of collective farmers showed true heroism and, overcoming all difficulties, built the canal. The success of the Lagan Canal greatly boosted the enthusiasm of collective farms in all districts and regions of Uzbekistan. In the spring of 1939 alone, collective farmers constructed 46 large irrigation structures, canals, and collectors. Their total length was more than 600 km, which

made it possible to cultivate about 20,000 hectares of new irrigated land. The collective farmers of the Fergana Valley put forward the idea of building the Great Fergana Canal. Stalin approved this popular initiative. For this construction, 30 million rubles, 15,000 cubic meters of lumber, 200 automobiles, 60 tractors, iron, cement, and other materials were allocated. The grandiose construction of the 270 km-long Great Fergana Canal began on August 1, 1939. About 160,000 collective farmers of the Fergana Valley, invoking Stalin's name, set out to build the canal with high spirits and zeal. In an unprecedented timeframe, the canal's construction was completed in 50 days. More than 16 million cubic meters of earth were excavated. Within 4 months, all hydraulic structures were built, and water was channeled into the Great Fergana Canal. According to irrigation engineers' calculations, building such a canal would have taken more than 7 years under the "old norms." By beginning to implement the Stalinist program for the further development of cotton cultivation, the collective farmers of Uzbekistan accomplished major works in the field of irrigation in 1940. On construction projects built by the people, more than 40 million cubic meters of earthworks were completed, which was 73% more than in 1939. Irrigated lands increased by more than 70,000 hectares. In total, 51 irrigation facilities were built in Uzbekistan in 1939. 22.8 million cubic meters of soil were excavated. 1,332.2 km of canals and collectors were dug, and 73,000 hectares of new irrigated land were brought under cultivation. During the same year, 250,000 hectares of new irrigated land were developed[54]. In 1940, about 70,000 hectares of irrigated land were put into operation. The completion of the already-built canal structures made it possible to increase the area of new irrigated land to 260,000 hectares.

In the republic, good organizational specialists became masters of agriculture. The anti-party practice of frequent changes of collective farm management personnel, foremen, and unit leaders was condemned, and it was emphasized that collective farms should always be assisted in selecting collective farm brigade and unit leaders from among the most capable and experienced collective farmers[55]. Stalin said that "the leading organizations that took on the task of leading the new collective farms should clearly understand that "...the center of gravity of responsibility for managing the farm has now shifted from the individual peasants to the leadership of the collective farm. Now the peasants demand that the collective farm leaders take care of the economy and conduct the work well, not from themselves" [56]. However, it was difficult to expect reforms that would increase the efficiency of agriculture in the future from uneducated, untrained, and unable to master modern scientific and technical achievements in a timely manner. The leadership stated, "The most important task before us now is to deliver the cotton harvest to our country as quickly as possible. During the Patriotic War, the party and the government, our Red Army, demanded this of us. We must further increase the current pace of cotton production. There can be no reason to slow down the pace of cotton production. The most important condition for the timely delivery of harvested cotton to the state is the maximum use of horse-drawn carts on collective farms. Collective farm boards must use horse-drawn carts in accordance with the established schedule for transporting cotton and never allow horse-drawn carts to stop without reason" [57]. In practice, it is seen that during this period more than 90% of the rural population was mainly engaged in manual labor and work with draft animals[58]. In 1941, 27,888 mechanized workers worked in Uzbek farms, but in 1943 their number had decreased to 2,775[59]. Training new mechanized personnel to replace those who went to war occupied an important place in the work of the Uzbek party organization. During the war years, 33,171 people were trained for the MTS and state farms, including 26,274 tractor drivers, 1,710 tractor foremen, 469 repair mechanics, 1,180 combine harvesters, 369 combine harvester assistants, and 1,080 drivers. people, repair personnel - 2089 people were trained[60]. During the war, the training of this type of personnel was carried out mainly at the expense of women. Of

the above, 12000 people were trained in 1941, 7975 in 1942, and 139 in 1943, a total of 21,714 women. During this period, 10210.4 thousand rubles were spent on training personnel in the agricultural sector, and 2134 thousand rubles were spent on training personnel in the People's Commissariat of State Farms[61]. In the Khorezm region, 11246 people and 7439 agricultural managers were retrained in mechanized personnel training courses, of which 9520 were Uzbeks[62]. In the Sverdlovsk rural soviet of the Yangiyul district of the Tashkent region, there were no female watermen in the Yusupov collective farm. In 19 units, women operated agricultural machinery for irrigating cotton and other crops. studied. Women were also tasked with learning cotton cultivation. They began to learn various agricultural and horticultural skills, such as melon picking and pruning vines in the garden. I.V. Stalin assessed that “Women are a great force on the collective farm.” The women of that time worked hard to live up to this assessment given by Stalin, and it was the great duty of every collective farmer woman to further demonstrate that women are a great force[63]. The Soviet administration emphasized that among the local population in the region, there should be a woman agronomist, a woman healer, a woman irrigator, and a woman teacher - this is a great and fundamental task, for which it is necessary to fight and work[64].

In conclusion, it should be noted that although the quality of agricultural specialists has improved somewhat, the union, without taking into account local conditions, has continued to issue too many uniform instructions to collective farms and state farms from above, stifling the initiatives of all workers, leading and specialized personnel in agriculture. The state's extensive interference in the system of traditional economic relations in the countryside, the forced imposition of socialist relations that are harmful to agriculture, has destroyed the internal opportunities for independent development. It has hindered the management of work in an orderly and standardized manner. The Soviet government's improper attitude towards local agricultural specialists, and the disregard for their knowledge and experience have also been among the reasons for the backwardness of agricultural work. As a result, the policy of excessive centralization of the economy has led to the contradictory development of agriculture, which has had a negative impact on the attitude of workers and specialized personnel to labor, social activity, and living standards. This situation shows the limited possibilities of sustainable and independent development of the agricultural sector in the republic.

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